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One-fourth of deportees from the United States are parents of US-cit-
izen children. We do not know how separation from families affects
remigration among deportees, who face high penalties given unlawful
reentry. We examined how family separation affects intent to remi-
grate among Salvadoran deportees. The majority of deportees with
children in the United States were also separated from their spouse,
and the vast majority had US-citizen children. Family separation was
the single most important factor affecting intent to remigrate. We
interpret these findings in light of immigration policy debates.
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INTRODUCTION
In the two-year period between July 2010 and September 2012, the US
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported 204,810 parents of
US-citizen children, who made up one-fourth of all removals (Colorlines
2012).2 The forced separation of these parents from their children — the
creation of involuntary transnational families — has multiple negative
consequences on children, parents, and other family members (Capps
et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010; Dreby 2012). Recent policy changes in
the administration of President Obama recognize the hardships that
immigration policy imposes on mixed-status families (i.e., families where
parents and children hold different immigration status). For example, the
I-601A provisional waiver, an administrative provision of the federal law
governing US immigration, effective March 2013, allows unlawful
entrants who are immediate relatives of US citizens and who are in the
process of obtaining a legal visa to apply for a waiver to complete the pro-
cess in the United States rather than in their country of origin.3 However,
this new rule does not protect the majority of undocumented migrants,
including those who do not have means to adjust their status and those
who are deported and reenter the United States.
In the United States, as in many other countries, deportees face harsh
penalties if they reenter without authorization; in the United States, these
“repeat violators” are classified by DHS as second priority for deportation
behind criminal offenders. Furthermore, US federal immigration law classi-
fies a second-time violation of illegal entry as a felony subject to up to two
years in prison; if the deportee has a prior criminal record, the maximum
penalty for reentry is 10 years in prison. Because a second violation of
illegal entry is classified as a felony, the 10-year sentence applies to third-
time violators. These criminal penalties mean that repeat violators are
2This count was obtained by Colorlines via a Freedom of Information Act request. It
includes voluntary removals. It underrepresents the number of deportees with children in
the United States, as parents of non-US-citizen children in the United States are not
recorded (Colorlines 2012).
3The I-601A waiver allows entrants to adjust their status in the United States without hav-
ing to return to their country of origin, which would invoke a three- to 10-year bar on
reentry. This provision is only for entrants who have US-citizen spouses, children, or par-
ents. For more information about this wavier, and changes in the implementation of I-
610A provisional waivers, consult with US Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS)
website, http://www.uscis.gov/i-601.
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inadmissible under US federal immigration law and thus cannot qualify
for legal status in the United States.
In spite of the severe penalties associated with repeat migration
among deportees, studies have shown that a substantial portion of depor-
tees — more than a third — intend to remigrate to the United States
(Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008), which is similar to the rates of
intended and actual remigration among deportees elsewhere (Collyer
2012). This rate may vary by transnational family structure and be espe-
cially strong when deportation splits families across countries. DHS data,
which are limited to migrants apprehended by the agency and may there-
fore undercount repeat migration (given that some portions of undocu-
mented migrants are not apprehended), show that while 21 percent of all
deportees in the United States are repeat violators, more than a third of
deportee parents of US-citizen children are repeat violators (DHS 2009;
ICE 2012). The fact that a greater percentage of deportee parents are
repeat violators suggests that parents of dependent children in the United
States may be especially motivated to remigrate, presumably to rejoin their
families.
While the DHS data are suggestive that parents of dependent chil-
dren are more likely than other deportees to remigrate to the United
States, and research has suggested that transnational ties are an important
motivation for remigration among deportees in the United States and
elsewhere, there is limited empirical evidence on the post-deportation
experience, including on how dependent children or other family mem-
bers in the destination country influence the decision to remigrate follow-
ing deportation (Schuster and Majidi 2013). This is especially pertinent
for studies of deportees from the United States, where judges no longer
have discretionary authority to consider dependent family members in
deportation hearings. To our knowledge, there is no empirical research on
the decision to remigrate among US deportees, who, given their forced
repatriation and the penalties imposed upon reentry, are a unique and
policy-relevant group.
Although the I-601A provisional waiver would allow some parents
of US-citizen children protection from deportation, adjustment of status
is a costly, difficult, and uncertain process even without having to return
to the country of origin. Moreover, this protection is not afforded to
undocumented immigrants with a previous deportation record, nor does
it apply to undocumented parents who are arrested for misdemeanors and
put into deportation proceedings on the basis of their undocumented
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status, as per President Obama’s Secure Communities program. Given the
large number of parents being deported by the US government, the
impacts of these deportations on children, the appearance in DHS data
that a large number of these parents remigrate, and the current policy
attention to this issue, research is sorely needed to understand the inten-
tions and behaviors of deported parents.
To this end, this study investigated the impact of involuntary
transnational family structure — families split across countries by deporta-
tion — on male Salvadoran deportees’ intent to remigrate without legal
documents to the United States. Because penalties for reentry increase with
prior criminal records, we also examined variation in intent to remigrate by
deportees’ reported reason for deportation (criminal offense versus immigra-
tion violation), and because the policy discussion tends to focus on hardship
to US-citizen children, we examined variation in intent to remigrate by the
citizenship status of deportees’ children. First, we describe the policy back-
ground and research literature that frames our study.
BACKGROUND
US Immigration Policy and Deportation
US immigration policy, especially with regard to deportation, changed
dramatically in the second half of the 1990s. In 1996, President Clinton
signed two laws into place that increased the federal government’s ability
to deport immigrants. The first law was the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). IIRIRA increased govern-
ment spending for large-scale removals and border control efforts, as
well as expanded the list of deportable crimes to include 28 offenses,
including non-violent theft, fraud or deceit, perjury, forgery, and tax
evasion. Under this new law, legal permanent residents convicted of
these crimes are subject to mandatory removal, even when they had
served time for their offense many years prior to the passage of the law.
According to Human Rights Watch (2009), nearly 68 percent of legal
permanent residents who were removed from the United States follow-
ing this law were removed for non-violent, minor crimes. The second
law passed in 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), significantly limited prosecutorial discretion as well as the
individual right to judicial review prior to removal. Before AEDPA and
IIRIRA, immigrants could request a hearing and a judge had the discre-
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tionary power to suspend a deportation. However, the elimination of
prosecutorial discretion prohibited US judges from canceling deportation
orders or making decisions in the best interest of the child (Hagan,
Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008).
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought about a new
immigration enforcement regime that greatly increased the risk of deten-
tion and deportation for immigrants in the United States (Coleman 2007;
Kanstroom 2007). Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act by Congress less
than six weeks after the terrorist attacks demonstrated the forceful
response by the US federal government as the new law provided special
powers to investigate, apprehend, and detain immigrants thought to be a
national security risk. More fundamental change in immigration enforce-
ment after 9/11, however, came in the reorganization of the long-existent
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the DHS, established
in March 2003. While the Border Patrol enforcement branch of the INS
concentrated mainly on border regions, the new bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS operated as a nationwide
deportation police force, in addition to investigating criminal activity
entering the boundaries of the country. Within just a few months after its
establishment, ICE produced a strategic plan, titled “Endgame,” for
deporting all “removable aliens” by the year 2012 (ICE 2003).
In its pursuit of a new regime of immigration enforcement, ICE
undertook a series of special operations to apprehend, detain, and deport
immigrants, in addition to conducting workplace raids (Wessler 2011).
For example, ICE initiated the Criminal Alien Program to search for
convicted criminal immigrants in local jails and state prisons and place
them in deportation proceedings, accounting for 164,296 deportations
in FY2007 and 221,085 in FY2008, as the program got off the ground
(ICE 2008). Another special operation occurred in 2006–2007, when
ICE implemented Operation Return to Sender to apprehend dangerous
immigrant criminals, including convicted immigrants and gang members,
arresting over 23,000 immigrants (McKinley 2007). Secure Communities
became the most comprehensive ICE enforcement program as it
required all state and local police agencies to forward the fingerprint
data of all arrested persons to DHS to check against a biometric data-
base. Between 2008 and 2012, Secure Communities resulted in more
than 166,000 deportations of immigrants identified through biometric
data (ICE 2013a). To add to its Endgame programs, ICE also took over
the federal program of training state and local police in immigration
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enforcement, as authorized by Section 287(g) of IIRIRA, resulting in
the identification of 309,283 “potentially removable aliens” between
2006 and 2013 through collaboration with state and local authorities
(ICE 2013b).
The cumulative effect of these laws on immigration enforcement is
unprecedented; its impact is reflected in the growing number of removals
each year, as illustrated in Figure I. From 1993 to 1996, an average of
52,000 migrants were removed from the United States each year (DHS
1998, Table 66). Between 1996 and 2011, the average number of remo-
vals increased to roughly 213,000 per year, reaching a high of nearly
400,000 removals in 2011, the most recent year for which there are data
(DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41).
Much of the growth in removals has involved migrants from Mex-
ico and Central and South America. In 2011, these migrants represented
96 percent of all removals from the United States (DHS 2012a, 2012b,
Table 41). Migrants from El Salvador comprised the third largest group
of removals from Central America, next to migrants from Honduras
and Guatemala; migrants of Mexican origin were the largest group
(Blanchard et al. 2011; DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41). In 1996, 2,472
Salvadorans were removed from the United States (DHS 1998, Table
66); by 2011, this number had reached nearly 20,000 (DHS 2012a,
2012b, Table 41).
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Transnational Families via Split-family Deportation
In the United States, studies suggest that the deportation of parents lar-
gely occurs within mixed-status families, which are defined as families
with at least one non-citizen parent and one or more citizen children (Fix
and Zimmerman 1999). One in five children in the United States lives in
an immigrant family, and a third of these children live in mixed-status
families (Fortuny and Chaudry 2009). Nearly five million children live
with one or more undocumented parents (Capps et al. 2007). However,
many parents deported from the United States are legal permanent resi-
dents deported for criminal or non-criminal offenses. Roughly 100,000
children experienced the removal of a parent who was a legal permanent
resident during 1997–2007, and nearly 88 percent of these removals
involved parents of US-citizen children (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010).
The forced separation of parents from their children through depor-
tation creates a transnational family (Dreby 2006). The vast majority of
research on transnational families has focused on families formed through
the voluntary (if constrained) decisions of parents to migrate. For exam-
ple, Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) studied the meaning of mother-
hood among domestic workers in Southern California who had migrated
to support children left behind with relatives in origin countries. Children
in these “voluntary” transnational families are left behind for a multitude
of reasons, including the planned finite duration of migrations, the rela-
tively more affordable cost of living in the origin country, the inability of
migrant parents (especially live-in domestic workers) to care for children
when working in the destination country, and parents’ belief that children
will be better off at home.
In the case of families separated by deportation, transnational fami-
lies take the form of children left behind in the destination country,
rather than the country of origin, and, as reviewed above, the migrant
parents’ destination country is often the child’s country of citizenship.
These families are “involuntary” transnational families insofar as the sepa-
ration between country of origin and country of destination was due to
arrest and deportation in a policy context where no consideration is given
to the welfare of children and spouses who remain in the destination
country. However, in drawing a distinction between “voluntary” and
“involuntary,” we do not mean to suggest greater agency on the part of
parents who leave their children in the sending country; they too are
severely constrained by the economic and political conditions they face
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both in the origin and in destination countries (Hondagneu-Sotelo and
Avila 1997).
Parents in involuntary transnational families face the decision of
whether children should move to their parents’ country of origin, whether
children should remain in the destination country with the other parent
or extended family, or whether the deportee should remigrate without
documents to the country of destination, facing harsh penalties if caught.
Precise data on the number of families with US-citizen children living in
the parents’ country of origin are not available. Passel, Cohn, and Gonz-
alez-Barerra (2012) indicated that the best estimates range between 5 per-
cent and 35 percent of the 1.4 million Mexicans who returned to Mexico
between 2005 and 2010, including 300,000 US-born children, likely did
so because of (parents’) deportation. However, these returnees involve
only a minority of all children whose parents are deported. Several studies
have found that the majority of children whose parents are deported
remain in the United States with the other parent or extended family
(Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010). These decisions may be made
in part because deportees intend to remigrate rather than remaining sepa-
rated from their children.
Impact of Deportation on Families
The creation of involuntary transnational families through deportation has
profound and deleterious effects on children, their parents, and other fam-
ily members. Even without the trauma of deportation, research has found
that aggressive immigration enforcement and deportation policy signifi-
cantly impacts mixed-status (as well as legal immigrant) families by increas-
ing anxiety, stress, depression, and fear; reinforcing social isolation; and
generating mistrust of government in immigrant communities (Rodriguez
and Hagan 2004; Chaudry et al. 2010; Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro
2011; Dreby 2012). Most research has focused on the direct effects of
deportation, including economic and psychological impacts, on US chil-
dren. Next, we describe the state of this research in the US context.4
4We were unable to find research studies of the effects of deportation on children in destina-
tion countries other than the United States. This may reflect the fact that the United States
is unique among countries of immigration for deporting large numbers of parents whose
children remain in the country of destination. However, research has found similar effects of
family separation in other contexts, including the tremendous impact of separation from par-
ents on children as a result of war, terrorist attacks, and incarceration (Boss 2002, 2004).
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Parental deportation has large negative consequences for family eco-
nomic stability (Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010; First Focus,
2010; Dreby 2012). Families typically experience significant economic
hardship after the arrest of a family member — this is particularly true
when the breadwinner is detained or deported. Changes in family struc-
ture are eminent, with families usually changing from a two-parent, two-
income household to single-parent — most female-headed — household
(Dreby 2012). These families are often vulnerable to begin with; for
example, families affected by workforce raids in Iowa and Massachusetts
did not have significant savings or assets at the time of detention (Capps
et al. 2007). Following deportation, existing family assets and resources
diminished quickly, and as a consequence, extended family or kin net-
works often assumed significant financial and caretaking responsibilities
(Capps et al. 2007). Families affected by deportation may be afraid to
seek resources, especially from governmental agencies, even when children
are eligible for these resources (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011).
Similarly, the short- and long-term psychological consequences of
family separation on child well-being have been well documented (Hon-
dagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Garcia Coll and Magnuson 2005; Chau-
dry et al. 2010; Suarez-Orozco, Bang, and Kim 2011; Dreby 2012). In a
survey of US children affected by parental deportation, initial symptoms
of family separation on children included eating and sleeping problems,
social withdrawal, separation anxiety, and declining academic performance
(Chaudry et al. 2010; Suarez-Orozco, Bang, and Kim 2011). According
to one study (Chaudry et al. 2010), nine months following the removal
of a family member, 36 percent of children experienced three or more
behavioral and psychological symptoms. These symptoms were most
severe among children whose parents were arrested in the home, children
who were separated from their parent for more than one month, and in
cases where the child’s primary caregiver was deported (Chaudry et al.
2010).
Research on Return and Repeat Migration
The economic and emotional hardships endured by involuntary transna-
tional families are likely a strong motivation for deported parents to
reunite with their children. As already described, we do not know how
common this reunion is. This study attempts to shed some light on this
process by focusing on how involuntary transnational family structure
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influences intent to remigrate among deported Salvadoran men. However,
other factors despite transnational family structure likely affect remigration
— indeed, some portions of repeat violators do not have US-citizen chil-
dren (DHS 2009). For example, experiences of stigma and displacement
in the country of origin are difficult social and psychological barriers fac-
ing deportees that may encourage remigration, and deportees may hold
debts that they cannot pay through wages earned in their home countries
(Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Schuster and Majidi 2013). However,
research on the post-deportation experience is limited, so we draw from
central findings from sociological and demographic research on return and
repeat migration to inform our understanding of these more general pro-
cesses.
Return and repeat migration are common, although estimates vary
widely and are not reported for specific immigrant groups other than
Mexicans (Van Hook et al. 2006). Recent estimates suggest that 3 percent
of all immigrants departed the United States per year between 1996 and
2009, which means that one-fourth of immigrants arriving in a given year
leave within 10 years (Van Hook and Zhang 2011). Repeat migration to
the United States among these returned migrants is harder to measure,
and current estimates are not available. Older data from Mexico suggest
that one-third of return migrants remigrated to the United States between
1965 and 1985 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002), although the num-
ber remigrating from countries that are farther away (such as El Salvador)
is likely smaller. While one may expect that increasing enforcement in the
post-1985 period would arguably deter remigration, a recent study finds
that increases in the number of annual deportations actually increase the
likelihood of repeat migration among Latin American migrants (Riosmena
and Massey 2010). Repeat migration may be even more common among
deportees, as suggested by several studies from a variety of international
settings (Peutz 2006; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008; Brotherton
and Barrios 2009; Schuster and Majidi 2013).
Determinants of repeat migration include social networks, economic
incentives, and cultural and linguistic ties (Massey and Espinosa 1997;
Reagan and Olsen 2000; Constant and Zimmermann 2012). In a study
of US–Mexico migration, Massey and Espinosa (1997) found that the
characteristics of migrants who initiate multiple trips are different from
those making a first trip. Not surprisingly, migrants with a history of
repeat migration had greater social and human capital specific to the desti-
nation, such as more migrant work experience, a spouse in the United
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States, and US-citizen children. Social factors, such as spouse and children
in the United States, were more strongly related to repeat migration for
both documented and unauthorized migrants than were economic and
human capital indicators. These findings are consistent with research using
panel data from Germany, which found that migrants with a spouse and
child in Germany were more likely to remain rather than returning to
their home country (Constant and Zimmermann 2012).
Repeat migration among deportees may be even more common
than repeat migration among so-called voluntary migrants for at least
two reasons (Schuster and Majidi 2013). One is that deportees face
stigma associated with the experience of deportation. In a study of
Dominican deportees, stigma upon arrival to the Dominican Republic
created tremendous social and psychological strain (Brotherton and Bar-
rios 2009). Feelings of depression and suicide were present, especially
among deportees with spouses and children who remained in the
United States (Brotherton and Barrios 2009). Similar experiences of
stigma and displacement were reported among Salvadorans deported
from the United States (Hagan 2009). Second, deportees may face
greater economic barriers than other returned migrants (Schuster and
Majidi 2013). Deportees may not have paid off migration-related debts
or reached their target earnings. Among Dominican deportees, the record
of incarceration in the United States tarnished their name and prevented
them from obtaining jobs in Santo Domingo. Yet, despite having some
understanding of how stigma and economic displacement impact individ-
uals who are forced to repatriate to their country of origin, how these
factors influence return migration, or whether this is a central and/or
distinct motivation underlying remigration among those separated from
family, is unknown, an issue that we return to in the discussion.
While the studies above highlight the importance of family in
migrants’ decision to remigrate, this research does not examine specifi-
cally how forced repatriation to one’s country of origin — as in the case
of deportation — affects the likelihood of repeat migration. Individuals
who are removed from the United States face the heavy legal penalty of
incarceration for undocumented repeat migration. In this paper, we
examine intent to remigrate among a sample of deportees and the effect
that involuntary transnational family structure, as well as other measures
of social and economic integration into the destination country, has on
that intention. We describe the methods of our analysis next, before
turning to our results.
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METHODS
Deportee Survey and Sample
The data for this study come from a survey of deportees conducted by the
Salvadoran deportee reintegration program, “Bienvenido a Casa” (“Wel-
come Home,” or BAC). BAC provides information and assistance, includ-
ing transportation, temporary housing, legal services, and medical care, to
deportees in El Salvador (for more information about the survey, see Ha-
gan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008).5 Salvadoran deportees register with
BAC immediately upon deboarding ICE planes at the airport in San Sal-
vador. In the summer of 2002, BAC started a job training and placement
program to supplement existing services. Deportees who had been regis-
tered by BAC when they arrived at the airport were contacted for partici-
pation in the program, and a random sample of 300 deportees who
attended meetings about the program were selected for inclusion in the
survey (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004). Although the sample was not
selected from the entire population of Salvadoran deportees, Hagan, Esch-
bach, and Rodriguez (2008) compared the survey sample to the full cen-
sus of deportees registered with BAC and found that they were similar in
terms of sex, age, years in the United States, English ability, and reason
for deportation. We use the BAC sample data rather than the BAC census
because the sample data include information about location of spouse and
children and intention to remigrate.
We limit our sample to male deportees because the small number of
female deportees in the BAC sample precluded our ability to say anything
meaningful about gender. Men are far more likely to be deported than
women (Golash-Boza 2012); indeed, only 5 percent of all BAC census
deportees are female (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008), and in our
analytical sample, there were a total of only 16 women. Remigration
intentions and the effect of family structure on those intentions are likely
different for men and women (e.g., see studies on gender and other
aspects of the migration experience, including on the decision to migrate,
5A commission of Salvadoran business, religious, and governmental organizations initially
created BAC, acting with support from USAID (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008).
In 2004, the Salvadoran government assumed the responsibilities of BAC. The program is
currently under Servicio de Atencion a Repatriados, or Services for the Repatriated, which
is part of the Ministerio de la Direccion General De Migracion y Extranjerıa (2012) in El
Salvador.
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Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; on remittances, Abrego 2009; on transnational
parenting, Dreby 2006; and on citizenship, Glenn 2002). Given the small
sample of women in the BAC data, we could not examine this hypothesis.
Results including women did not significantly differ from those excluding
women; however, we could not include sex as a covariate in multivariate
analyses because it fully predicted the dependent variable. We decided to
omit women from the analysis to keep our findings specific to men, rather
than including women but be unable to address whether and how they
are different.
A significant portion of the male deportees (n = 98; 34%) were
missing data on one or more of the variables we used in the analysis.
Using casewise deletion, this leaves a final analytic sample of 186 cases
with complete data. This large amount of missing data is not surprising
given that men who have been deported are a vulnerable group who may
not be willing to share information, particularly as it relates to the loca-
tion of their children and spouse. We conducted several sets of analyses to
assess the extent and influence of non-response bias. To begin, we exam-
ined the characteristics of those with complete data on all covariates to
those who have complete data on each covariate but are missing data on
one or more of the others (results are reported in Appendix A). Those
with missing data had less human and social capital. Specifically, they had
spent fewer years in the United States, had fewer years of education, were
less likely to speak English, and were less likely to have children or a
spouse in the United States. Correspondingly, given our expectations
about how these factors affect intention to remigrate, respondents’ missing
data were less likely to intend to remigrate to the United States. Excluding
these deportees means that we overestimate intention to remigrate: In the
sample with non-missing data on remigration, 39 percent stated they
intended to remigrate, compared to 44 percent in our analytic sample. We
are careful to interpret our estimates of intent to remigrate accordingly.
Given that the pattern of non-response is not random, we conducted
three additional sets of analyses to test the sensitivity of our multivariate
results to the exclusion of cases with missing data. First, we examined the
relationship between transnational family structure and intent to return
for those with complete data on those variables (results in Appendix A).
These results replicated the bivariate relationship observed between our
key independent and dependent variables in the sample with complete
data. Second, we mean imputed missing data on continuous covariates,
and we included dummy variables for missing data on categorical covari-
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ates but excluded cases with missing data on transnational family struc-
ture. These results, for a sample of 207 cases, were no different from
those on the sample with complete data (key results shown in Appen-
dix A; full results available upon request). Third, we used Stata’s multiple
imputation techniques to impute all missing data, including missing data
on the key independent variables, for a multiply imputed sample of 284
cases (StataCorp 2009). Again, these results were consistent with those
presented below (key results shown in Appendix A; full results available
upon request). These analyses give us confidence that the results reported
below in the sample with complete data are not biased by non-response.
Measures
The dependent variable, intent to remigrate, was assessed with the ques-
tion, “Do you plan to return to the United States?” The response catego-
ries included, “No, I plan to stay in El Salvador,” “I am undecided about
returning to the United States,” and “Yes, I am planning on re-migrating
to the United States.” In the original BAC sample of male deportees, 34
percent of deportees indicated that they planned to remain in El Salvador,
28 percent reported they were undecided about remigrating, and 38 per-
cent stated they would remigrate to the United States. As described above,
in our analytic sample with complete data on all covariates, a larger pro-
portion, 44 percent, stated that they intend to remigrate.
While measuring behavior is preferable to intentions, to our knowl-
edge DHS data are the only existing data source on observed repeat
migration among deportees, and as described in the introduction, DHS
data omit repeat migrants who are not apprehended by the agency and
DHS data do not include those who may but do not remigrate, the key
comparison group for determining what influences remigration. Research
shows that migration intentions are strongly predictive of migration
behavior, although some portion of those who intend to migrate do not
and some portion of those who do not intend to migrate do (Card 1982;
de Jong et al. 1985; Lu 1999). We return to the relationship between
intentions and behavior, and its effect on our results, in the discussion.
We grouped those who do not plan to remigrate and those who are
undecided together. Research shows that those who intend to remigrate
are most likely to do so (Card 1982; Lu 1999). We compared those who
were undecided to those who said they did not intend to remigrate and
those who said they did intend to remigrate, and we found that they were
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more similar to those who did not intend to remigrate in terms of family
structure, years in the United States, level of education, employment prior
to deportation, and English-language ability. Finally, we estimated the
analysis omitting the undecided group, and our results did not differ in
meaningful ways from those we present below.6
Our key independent variables measure the deportee’s transnational
family structure. Transnational families can be defined in a number of
ways, but key considerations include the location of family members in
distinct nation-states, whether families are defined as nuclear or extended,
and the degree of interaction between family members across international
borders. Here, we limit our definition to nuclear families — parents and
children — split between the United States and El Salvador as a result of
deportation. This reflects both the limits of the questions asked on the
deportee survey — that is, we do not know about extended family mem-
bers or regular interaction — and the intent of our research question. We
are interested in whether the existence of a transnational family structure
impacts intent to remigrate among deportees, not in differences between
transnational families in the content of their interactions or exchanges, an
important but distinct research question that we leave for future studies.
We draw on current scholarship on transnational family structure to
define three unique measures of transnational families. This scholarship
emphasizes the location of children and spouses, recognizing that even with
a narrow focus on nuclear families, complex arrangements result (Dreby
2006). Thus, we first examine the presence and location of dependent chil-
dren, or children under the age of 18 (hereafter referred to as children).
We differentiated between deportees with no children or children in El
Salvador (n = 85) and deportees with dependent children in the United
States (n = 101). We grouped deportees with no children with deportees
with children in El Salvador because of the small number of deportees with
children only in El Salvador (n = 10). Deportees who had children in both
El Salvador and the United States (n = 6) were coded as having children in
the United States; this group was too small to analyze separately.
We next examined marital status and location of the spouse, differ-
entiating between unmarried deportees (n = 85), deportees whose spouse
was in El Salvador (n = 27), and deportees whose spouse was in the
United States (n = 74). We analyzed these family structure variables sepa-
6Standard errors were larger, with significance levels for some key variables dropping below
0.05.
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rately to assess the separate impacts of children and spouse on intent to
remigrate, and then we combined them to assess differences in intent to
remigrate based on the combined family structure. This combined family
structure variable has six categories: not married and no children or chil-
dren in El Salvador only (n = 61); not married with children in the
United States (n = 24); spouse is in El Salvador with no children or chil-
dren in El Salvador only (n = 13); spouse is in El Salvador and children
are in the United States (n = 14); spouse is in the United States and no
children or children in El Salvador only (n = 11); and spouse is in the
United States and children are in the United States (n = 63). Most of
these groups are too small to make meaningful inferences about their
intent to remigrate; however, rather than collapsing them into a heteroge-
neous and incoherent grouping, we simply note that the estimates of
intent to remigrate for these groups are unreliable.
In addition to our primary analysis of the relationship between
transnational family structure and intent to remigrate, we considered two
key characteristics that might affect this relationship. First, we considered
the difference between US-citizen and non-US-citizen children because
policy discussions typically focus on the latter, giving preference to the
family members of US-citizen children. Because deportees may have more
than one child in the United States, and children may hold different sta-
tuses from each other, this variable measures whether deportees have at
least one US-citizen child in the United States. Second, we examined the
reason for deportation, which will affect penalties upon remigration and
therefore may affect intent to remigrate. We differentiated between depor-
tations for criminal offenses and for immigration violations.
Drawing from the sociological and demographic literature on return and
repeat migration, we controlled for factors that have been shown to be associ-
ated with repeat migration, namely age (in years), time in the United States
prior to deportation (in years), whether the deportee was employed prior to
deportation (1 = employed, versus 0 = not employed), whether the deportee
speaks English (1 = speaks English a little, well, or fluently, versus 0 = not at
all), and the deportee’s level of education (in years of completed schooling).
Analysis
We began the analysis by examining the average characteristics of our
sample of deportees as well as differences in those characteristics between
those who have children in the United States and those who do not. We
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then estimated a series of multivariate logistic regression models predicting
the log odds of intent to remigrate as a function of our three measures of
involuntary transnational family structure and the full set of control
variables. In subsequent analysis, we differentiated between deportees with
US-citizen and non-US-citizen children in the United States. Finally, we
estimated the full model predicting intent to remigrate separately for depor-
tees who were deported for criminal offenses and for deportees who were
deported for immigration violations. Stata 11 was used for all analyses.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the characteristics of our full sample of male Salvadoran
deportees and separately by transnational family structure (here, by chil-
dren). Deportees with children in the United States are more likely to
intend to remigrate than deportees without children: 52.5 percent compared
to 32.9 percent. Among deportees with children in the United States, the
majority (89.1%) had at least one US-citizen child and was also separated
from their spouse via deportation (62.4%). In contrast, among deportees
without children in the United States, none had US-citizen children and
only 12.9 percent were separated from their spouse via deportation.
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF MALE SALVADORAN DEPORTEES BY TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY STRUCTURE
All
Family structure
No Children
or Children
in El Salvador
Children
in the
United States
Intends to remigrate (%)** 43.6 32.9 52.5
Reason for deportation (%)**
Immigration violation 44.6 57.7 33.7
Criminal offense 55.4 42.4 66.3
US-citizen children (%)*** 48.4 0 89.1
Marital status/location of spouse (%)***
Unmarried 45.7 71.8 23.8
Married and spouse in El Salvador 14.5 15.3 13.9
Married and spouse in the US 39.8 12.9 62.4
Age (mean years)** 30.8 29.1 32.3
Time in the US (mean years)*** 10.7 7.6 13.3
Education (mean years) 8.7 8.6 8.8
Employed prior to deportation (%)** 76.9 67.1 85.2
Speaks English (%)** 83.9 74.1 92.1
Sample size 186 85 101
Source: BAC Deportee Survey, 2002.
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on chi-square tests of equal distributions or t-tests of equal
means.
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The majority of deportees in our analytical sample were deported
for a criminal offense. In additional analyses not shown, we found that
one-third of men deported for criminal offenses were deported for a vio-
lent crime, while another third of the sample reported non-violent crimes
(e.g., property crime, substance use, public disorder). The latter are crimi-
nal offenses that were not considered deportable prior to the 1996 passing
of IIRIRA. The final one-third of the sample did not answer, or refused
to answer, the question. The percentage of deportations involving a crimi-
nal offense was slightly higher in the current sample compared with the
proportion in the original BAC sample (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez
2008). This may reflect the nature of missing data in the data set, that is,
those missing data were less connected to the United States and therefore
more likely to be deported for an immigration violation rather than be
documented and deported for a criminal offense. Criminal offenses were
slightly more common among parents of children in the US, again reflect-
ing the fact that more integrated migrants — or those with children —
are more likely to be documented and therefore at risk of deportation for
reasons other than an immigration violation.
Indeed, deportees with children in the United States have greater
US-specific human capital than deportees without children in the United
States. They have spent, on average, six years longer in the United States
prior to deportation, they were more likely to be employed, and they were
more likely to speak English. Each of these variables is significantly associ-
ated with family structure in the bivariate analysis. Because these US con-
nections likely also affect intent to remigrate, it is important to control
for their influence in examining the relationship between transnational
family structure and intent to remigrate. We turn to these results next.
Table 2 presents results showing the relationship between transna-
tional family structure and intent to remigrate, net of the full set of con-
trol variables. Models 1–4 each present a different measure of
transnational family structure, and Models 5 and 6 present results for the
combined family structure variable separately for men deported for crimi-
nal offenses (Model 5) and for immigration violations (Model 6). The
results across all models show that all measures of transnational family
structure are consistently and strongly associated with intent to remigrate,
net of measured covariates. Deportees with children in the United States
have 2.6 greater odds than deportees without children or with children in
El Salvador of intending to remigrate. Deportees whose spouses are in the
United Staes have 2.7 greater odds of intending to remigrate than
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deportees who are unmarried. Deportees whose spouse and children are
both in the United States have the greatest odds of intending to remigrate:
They are 3.8 times more likely to intend to remigrate than unmarried and
childless deportees. Model 4 shows that deportees with US-citizen children
have greater odds of intending to remigrate than deportees with non-citizen
children in the United States; however, the odds ratio on deportees with
non-citizen children in the United States is based on a very small sample of
only 11 deportees and therefore should be interpreted with caution.
In Models 5 and 6, we examined whether the effect of family structure
varied for deportees who were deported for criminal offenses versus those
deported for immigration violations. The large positive association between
one’s spouse and children being in the United States and intent to remigrate
is observed for both groups, but it is larger and more significant for men
deported for criminal offenses. This is despite the fact that these men face
greater potential penalties if caught remigrating. We found similar results (not
shown) for our two other measures of transnational family structure.
With the exception of age, the associations between our control vari-
ables and intent to remigrate are not statistically significant in the multi-
variate models. Age is consistently related to intent to remigrate, with
younger men more likely to intend to remigrate than older men. Non-sig-
nificant results may be due to the small sample size.
In sum, our findings show that the majority of deportees with
dependent children in the United States intended to remigrate, the major-
ity of deportees with dependent children in the United States were also
separated from their spouse, and the vast majority — nearly 90 percent
— of Salvadoran deportees with children in the United States had at least
one US-citizen child. Compared to other social and economic connections
to the United States, transnational family structure is the most significant
factor influencing intent to remigrate. Salvadoran deportees whose spouse
and children are both in the United States, and whose children are US
citizens, were especially likely to intend to remigrate. These patterns do
not vary for men who were deported for immigration violations or crimi-
nal offenses. In the next section, we interpret these findings in light of the
current migration literature and immigration debate.
DISCUSSION
Current US deportation policies threaten immigrant families in the
United States, as both unauthorized migrants and legal permanent
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residents are at risk of deportation. Although the US Department of
Homeland Security has reduced worksite raids to apprehend unauthorized
migrant workers, the number of deportations continues to increase, partly
through the collaboration between state and local police departments and
federal immigration agencies, such as through the Secure Communities
program or 287(g) collaborations. The number of annual immigrant rem-
ovals during President Obama’s administration is the highest in history
(refer back to Figure I). Yet, despite these and other significant efforts to
deter unauthorized immigration, repeat migration among deportees is
common, and this appears to be especially so among parents of US-citizen
children. Empirical research identifying the negative impact of parental
separation and unauthorized status on children has fueled great criticism
of current immigration policy. Findings from our study contribute to this
policy discussion by focusing on how family structure affects Salvadoran
deportees’ intentions to remigrate.
The key finding from our study is that in spite of severe penalties
associated with the remigration of deportees to the United States, the
majority of Salvadoran men who were separated from their families
through deportation intend to remigrate. More than half of deportees in
our sample were separated from children and spouses in the United States
as a result of deportation, forming “involuntary” transnational families in
the process. This involuntary transnational family structure is the most
important factor influencing the intent to remigrate among Salvadoran
deportees, and this is true regardless of the reason for deportation, includ-
ing men who were deported for criminal offenses and face especially
severe penalties if apprehended upon reentry.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to document how transna-
tional family structure influences Salvadoran migrants’ intentions to remi-
grate to the United States following removal, and it also contributes to a
small but growing body of research on what happens post-deportation
(Schuster and Majidi 2013). We argue that transnational families formed
through deportation are involuntary, and they differ from voluntary trans-
national families in that children are left behind in the destination coun-
try, which is the child’s country of citizenship in the vast majority of
cases. Deportees in these families face no good solutions to the problem
of separation from their spouses and children — either they remove their
children from their country of citizenship, or they remigrate to a hostile
environment. Not surprisingly, we find that male Salvadoran deportees with
children and spouses in the United States are more likely than their
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counterparts without those family ties to intend to remigrate. Indeed, we
estimated that more than half of these men intend to remigrate, although
the true rate may be slightly lower given that men with fewer ties to the
United States were less likely to complete the survey.
These intentions could reflect the fact that deportees with families in
the United States have substantial US-specific human capital, including
English-language ability and US work experience, factors that past research
highlights as important determinants of remigration among both docu-
mented and undocumented migrants (Massey and Espinosa 1997). In our
data, Salvadoran deportees with children in the United States had spent a
greater number of years in the United States before deportation, had
higher levels of English-language ability, had higher levels of education,
and were more likely to be employed in the United States prior to depor-
tation than their counterparts without children in the United States. The
accumulation of human capital in the United States, rather than in their
home country, may make it difficult for deportees to support themselves
and their families in El Salvador. Although US-specific human capital may
motivate deportees to remigrate, we found that it was inconsequential in
comparison transnational family structure. That is, our regression results
showed that time in the United States, English-language ability, education,
and employment were not significantly associated with intent to remigrate
to the United States, whereas family was. This is a slight twist on the
research literature’s emphasis on social capital; for example, in Massey and
Espinosa’s (1997) groundbreaking study of the multiple determinants of
international migration from Mexico, they found that migrant networks
were one of three engines driving that flow (cf. Constant and Zimmer-
mann 2012). In this case, we do not believe that deportees are benefitting
from lower costs and information provided through migrant networks;
rather, our findings speak to the fact that deportees are primarily motivated
to rejoin their families in the United States.
Salvadoran men may be better able to support themselves and their
families working in the United States than in El Salvador, regardless of
their language and work experience. Deportees may choose to remigrate to
the United States and face the risk of severe penalties if apprehended
because this is likely the best choice in terms of not just reuniting with, but
also providing for, one’s family. In this way, deportees in involuntary trans-
national families are following the paths of mothers and fathers in “volun-
tary” transnational families — migrating despite the penalties and hardships
to provide for their families (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Dreby
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2010). However, in this case they are reuniting with children left behind in
the country of migration — which for most of their children is their coun-
try of birth — and facing especially severe legal penalties in doing so.
Indeed, the high rate of intent to remigrate among these deportees is
in spite of severe penalties associated with unlawful reentry among prior
deportees. These penalties increase if deportees were previously convicted
of crimes. A little more than half of the migrants (55.4%) in our sample
were deported for criminal offenses, and one-third of those deportees were
deported for violent offenses (i.e., a small minority of all Salvadoran
deportees in our sample were deported for violent offenses). Given the
harsh penalties associated with remigration among these deportees, we
would expect to find remigration intentions are different in this group.
However, we found that transnational family structure is at least as moti-
vating for these men to remigrate. Among migrants deported for a crimi-
nal offense, those with a spouse and dependent child were four times
more likely to intend to remigrate than their counterparts without families
in the United States. These findings suggest that the penalties associated
with detection are not a significant deterrent for deportees with criminal
records who have immediate family in the United States.
Our findings also speak to the intersections between states and their
policies, on the one hand, and migrants and their transnational families,
on the other. Our study underscores the tension in scholarship on trans-
nationalism between the perspective that migrants are “transnationalists
from below,” breaking the bounds of the nation-state through individual
acts of mobility (particularly via migration without legal documents), and
the nevertheless imposing structure of the nation-state system, which
remains firmly ensconced if occasionally transcended (Glick Schiller
1999). It resonates with a similar tension in scholarship on migration pol-
icy, which has often called into question the effectiveness of migration
policy at controlling international movement (e.g., Castles 2004). Indeed,
the harsh penalties imposed by US immigration policy aimed to deter
remigration of deportees are largely ineffective in the face of social pres-
sures for remigration (namely family reunion). On the other hand, it is
the effectiveness of US immigration policies, such as Secure Communities
and other measures to deport large numbers of migrants, that creates
involuntary transnational families in the first place (Zolberg 1999). Thus,
our study resonates with others from Europe and elsewhere arguing that
while state migration policies cannot effectively control human mobility,
they can nevertheless have devastating effects, and the United States is no
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exception in this matter (Peutz 2006; Schuster and Majidi 2013).
Migrants and their families, often spread across national boundaries, seek
some semblance of family life despite and in spite of these policies.
It is important to note that the current study examined intentions to
remigrate rather than actual behavior. Measuring behavior is preferable to
intent, as some individuals who intend to remigrate do not move while
others who did not intend to migrate may eventually take the journey
(Card 1982; Lu 1999). In the context of violence and insecurity related
to travel through Mexico, heavy border enforcement, and severe penalties
for reentry, it is possible that deportees state intentions to remigrate but
in fact do not. But the opposite is also possible — the risks associated
with remigration may mean deportees do not intend to migrate, but,
despite their best intentions, do in fact remigrate to the United States.
Intentions may reflect the “common sense” appraisal of the risks of remi-
gration, but ultimately, the psychological stress associated with long-term
separation for children and spouses, threats of family dissolution, experi-
ences of stigma in the home country, repayment of debt, and/or economic
deprivation may influence deportees to face those risks and return to the
United States (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Chaudry et al. 2010; Dreby
2012; Schuster and Majidi 2013).
Past research on US and international migration intentions and
behavior gives upper and lower bounds on the percentage of those intend-
ing to migrate who actually do: in Lu’s (1999) study of American migra-
tion, 45 percent who said they intended to migrate did; in Card’s (1982)
study of Filipino migration, 75 percent who said they intended to migrate
did. If between 45 percent and 75 percent of the deportees in our sample
who intended to remigrate actually do, then given a rate of 43.6 percent
of deportees who intend to migrate, we might expect that between 20 per-
cent and 32.7 percent actually do. The upper bound on this rate is similar
to the rate of remigration reported in a sample of documented and undoc-
umented migrants in Mexico between 1965 and 1985 (Massey, Durand,
and Malone 2002). Overall, this suggests that while remigration among
deportees is likely lower than it is among migrants who return voluntarily,
it is nevertheless a significant portion of deportees who remigrate.
Using these figures, results from our study, and DHS data on depor-
tations, we can estimate rough upper and lower bounds of the number of
Salvadoran deportee parents who will remigrate. In 2011, 17,308
Salvadorans were deported from the United States (DHS 2012a, 2012b).
In our data, 54 percent of Salvadoran deportees were parents of children
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in the United States, and 52.5 percent of them intended to return. Apply-
ing these numbers to the count of Salvadoran deportees in the DHS data,
an estimated 9,346 Salvadoran parents were separated from their children
in 2011, and 4,906 of them will intend to remigrate. Using the upper
and lower bounds established in the literature, between 2,208 and 3,679
actually will. Applying this same logic to all parents of US-citizen children
deported in 2011 (79,052), between 18,676 and 31,126 deported parents
will remigrate to the United States. These are sizable numbers of depor-
tees who could plausibly reenter the United States without documentation
to rejoin their families. However, the number of deportees who reenter is
arguably much larger if one considers that remigration is easier from Mex-
ico than it is from El Salvador because of shorter distance and a history
of circular migration between Mexico and the United States. By far the
majority of deportees are Mexican immigrants, and studies of Central
American and Mexican transnational families show that remigration is
more common among Mexicans than Central Americans (cf. Dreby 2010
versus Menjıvar and Abrego 2012).
In addition to family, there may be other reasons why deportees
return to the United States. As mentioned earlier, experiences of stigma
and economic displacement could be significant barriers to reintegration
in the country of origin (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Schuster and
Majidi 2013). Social and economic isolation also likely contributes to an
individual’s desire to remigrate. However, because measures of stigma
and displacement were not included in the survey tool, we were unable
to test this hypothesis. It is likely that stigma, economic hardship, and
family reunification influence an individual’s decision to repeat migration
to the United States. Future research in this area should include mea-
sures of family structure, economic displacement, and stigma to assess
the individual contribution of each of these in predicting the likelihood
of repeat migration.
Our study raises questions about the logic and cost-effectiveness of
deportation of parents of children in the United States, especially given
the psychological and financial consequences of deportation on families.
Even in families where deportees remigrate to the United States, “the
emotional and economic fallout is long-reaching” (Dreby 2012, 842). In
addition to the consequences of deportation on family members, immigra-
tion detention and removal operations are highly costly, with roughly
$2.55 billion spent annually. Given that deportees with family members
in the United States are highly likely to remigrate, it is important, if not
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urgent, to reconsider the deportation and detention policy surrounding
parents of dependent children (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010).
Several bills have been introduced in the US Senate and House of
Representatives to address issues of family separation following detention
and/or deportation. US Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-California)
introduced the Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections (HELP) for
Separated Children Act in 2009 and again in 2011 (H.R. 0.2607; First
Focus 2011). This act would provide national procedures for immigrant
enforcement activities that apprehend parents, guardians, or primary care-
givers of citizen children. In addition, it would provide the courts with an
opportunity to consider the best interest of the child and child’s family
prior to deportation. Similarly, US Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY)
introduced the Child Citizen Protections Act (H.R. 182) in 2009 and
then again in 2011. This bill would reinstate prosecutorial discretion for
judges in deportation cases involving parents of citizen children. These
bills have yet to pass in US Congress.
In the United States, immigration policy is largely handled at the fed-
eral level, but states have been increasingly taking measures to both control
and, less frequently, accommodate migrants. In California, for example,
Governor Jerry Brown recently signed two bills (AB2015 and SB1064) that
can be seen as models for other states. The first, AB2015, or Calls for Kids,
mandates that detained parents be given the right to call home and arrange
childcare; the second, SB1064, Reuniting Immigrant Families, authorizes
juvenile court judges to provide detained and deported parents additional
time to reunify with their children. Both of these bills were in response to
the report, Shattered Families: The Perilous Intersection of Immigrant Enforce-
ment and Child Welfare System (see Wessler 2011), which details stories of
parents losing custody of their children (i.e., children placed in the public
child welfare system) after they were detained and deported by DHS.
As described in the introduction, the most recent change in US
immigration regulation is related to a waiver of unlawful presence (the
I-601A provisional waiver). After March 4, 2013, unauthorized migrants
who have applications to adjust their legal status can apply for a waiver
that, if granted, will allow the individual to remain in the United States
while they complete the immigration process rather than waiting for the
process to unfold in their country of origin. It is important to emphasize
that this change in regulation is not an amnesty program and will affect
only unauthorized immigrants who have a legal way to adjust their status,
such as through immediate family ties to US citizens. US-citizen children
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can only sponsor their parents for legal status if the children are adults,
and for this reason and others, this change in regulation will not protect
all, or even most, US-citizen children against the hardship of family sepa-
ration and forced repatriation. What is missing from this change in regu-
lation is a mechanism that will protect all children against potential
separation from their parents through forced repatriation.
US immigration policy has explicitly recognized the importance of
family unification since the landmark amendment to the Immigration and
Nationality Act passed in 1965. Deportation for the sake of public safety
or security should be weighed on balance with the state’s interest in family
unity and well-being (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010). Our study shows
that deportees with a spouse and children in the United States are highly
likely to remigrate, and thus, the typical policy means for addressing
migrants’ unlawful presence in the United States — detention, deporta-
tion, and severe penalties for remigration — are clearly ineffective. Mean-
ingful exceptions to these policies should be provided to this population.
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TABLE A2
PERCENT OF SAMPLE WHO INTENDS TO REMIGRATE BY TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY STRUCTURE COMPARING
ANALYTIC SAMPLE TO SAMPLE WITH COMPLETE DATA ON BOTH VARIABLES
Analytic Sample
(Sample with Complete
Data on All Covariates)
Sample with
Non-missing Data
on DV and IV
Children
Children in the US 52.5 48.6
No children/children in ES 32.9 33.3
Marital status/location of spouse
Unmarried 36.5 38.4
Married and spouse in El Salvador 33.3 32.8
Married and spouse in United States 55.4 53.1
Source: BAC Deportee Survey, 2002.
TABLE A1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ANALYTIC SAMPLE (N = 186) COMPARED TO THE SAMPLE WITH NON-MISSING
DATA ON EACH COVARIATE (N VARIES BY COVARIATE)
Sample with Full
Data on All Covariates
(Analytic Sample)
Sample with Non-missing
Data on Each Covariate
but Missing on One or
More of the Others
Age (mean years) 30.8 31.4
Time in the US(mean years)*** 10.7 8.7
Education (mean years)** 8.7 8.2
Employed in US (%) 76.9 78.7
Speaks English (%)*** 83.9 73.7
Children in US (%)* 54.3 51.7
Spouse (%)***
Not married 45.7 47.4
Spouse in ES 14.5 22.0
Spouse in US 39.8 30.7
Plans to return (%) 43.6 39.4
Source: BAC Deportee Survey, 2002.
Note: The sample size in the second column varies according to the amount of missing data on each covariate.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on chi-square tests of equal distributions or t-tests of equal means.
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